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Is Epistocracy Irrational? 
Introduction 
It is commonly thought that widespread voter ignorance is a problem for democracies (Caplan, 
2007; Somin, 2013; Brennan, 2016). Ignorant voters can inadvertently vote against their interests. 
More generally, political leaders can supply harmful laws and policies by catering to the ill-
informed preferences of such voters. If the electorate wants bad policies, accommodating 
politicians will often satisfy their demands. Epistocrats think that we should mitigate the harm 
caused by voter ignorance by allocating comparatively greater amounts of political power to 
citizens who possess more politically relevant knowledge (Brennan, 2016; Jones, 2020).  
 One important challenge to epistocracy attacks the underlying assumption that better-
informed citizens possess superior political judgement (Friedman, 2019; Gunn, 2019; Hannon, 
ms). According to this challenge, while better-informed citizens may possess more knowledge of 
politically relevant facts, much research in political psychology indicates that better-informed 
citizens are less rational than their ill-informed counterparts, being more susceptible to various 
biases, more partisan, less openminded, and more prone to engaging in motivated reasoning. 
Correlatively, their ill-informed counterparts are less biased, less partisan, more openminded, and 
engage in motivated reasoning with less frequency (Box-Steffensmeier and De Boef, 2001; Zaller, 
2004; Achen and Bartels, 2006; Taber and Lodge, 2006; Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008; Taber, 
Cann, and Kucsova, 2009; Hartman and Newmark, 2012; Joslyn and Haider-Markel, 2013; Lodge 
and Taber, 2013; Kahan et al., 2017; Guay and Johnston, 2020). Epistocratic institutions, then, 
might just end up placing more political power in the hands of less rational citizens. There is no 
guarantee that such institutions would constitute an improvement over existing democratic 
2 
 
institutions, and they may even lead to worse governance and worse outcomes.1 Call this the 
problem of epistocratic irrationality. 
 In this paper I argue that the problem of epistocratic irrationality can be overcome. A closer 
look at the psychological data adverted to by critics of epistocracy shows that it is unclear whether 
it has the implications such critics claim it has. But even if the critics were right about these 
implications, it still would not follow that democratic institutions will outperform epistocratic 
institutions. Much depends on the precise form the envisaged epistocratic institutions take. A more 
considered approach to epistocratic institutional design might allow us to reap the benefits of 
placing more power in the hands of the more knowledgeable, while avoiding some of the costs 
associated with increasing the power of purportedly more dogmatic citizens. 
 I begin in Section 1 by outlining the problem voter ignorance presents democracy, before 
then discussing the problem of epistocratic irrationality at greater length. In Section 2 I argue that 
critics of epistocracy have downplayed and overlooked several problems with their arguments for 
epistocratic irrationality. First, the citizens counted as knowledgeable by the standards of the 
experiments critics advert to are not always such that they would be knowledgeable according to 
epistocratic standards. Second, the relationship between levels of political knowledge and political 
irrationality revealed by such experiments is often more complex than critics of epistocracy 
suppose. Third, the value of traits such as open-mindedness is easy to exaggerate. Even if less 
politically knowledgeable people were more openminded (and more knowledgeable people less 
openminded), it is unclear whether this would have the upshots attributed to it by critics of 
epistocracy. In Section 3 I argue that even if the relevant data has the implications critics claim it 
 
1 What it is to govern well is naturally a controversial question. In this paper, I focus solely on the relative epistemic 
merits of democratic institutions as against epistocratic institutions – that is, I focus on the degree to which such 
institutions (attempt to) create legislation grounded in objective facts, the degree to which such institutions deploy 
reliable means of institutional decision-making, and the like.  
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has, suitably amended forms of epistocracy could overcome the problem of epistocratic 
irrationality. I consider two potential strategies: (1) using refined selection mechanisms that avoid 
placing too much power in the hands of irrational citizens, and (2) increasing epistocratic influence 
only in those areas where such influence has a reliable track record of improving outcomes. I turn 
to consider some objections to my claims in Section 4. Section 5 concludes by summarizing the 
main claims of the paper. 
 
1. Democratic Ignorance and Epistocratic Irrationality 
The claim that a well-informed population is central to the health of a democracy is widely 
endorsed (Mill, 1861: Ch.2; Dewey, 1916; Gutmann, 1999). An uninformed population may not 
know which policies are in their best interests. An uninformed population cannot hold their 
representatives meaningfully accountable (Gutmann and Thomson, 2004: 35; Guerrero, 2014). 
Even epistemic democrats, sanguine as they are about individually ignorant voters, accept that a 
minimum level of voter competence is a necessary precondition of an epistemically well-
functioning democracy (Landemore, 2013; Goodin and Spiekermann, 2018).  
 However, many decades of empirical studies indicate that most voters are ignorant of even 
basic political facts.2 Not only are voters unfamiliar with simple, relatively uncontroversial 
findings in economics, political science, and other social sciences, they often don’t know basic 
facts such as which politicians were responsible for enacting certain pieces of legislation, what 
sorts of policies are favored by candidates for office, the various roles played by different political 
agents and organizations, the identity of their representatives, and so on. If a well-informed 
population is central to the health of democracies, and if most voters are politically ignorant, then 
 
2 For helpful overviews of the relevant literature, see Caplan (2007), Oppenheimer and Edwards (2012), Somin (2013), 
and Brennan (2016).  
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democracies face a serious problem. A necessary condition of a flourishing democracy is 
seemingly unsatisfied.  
 What, if anything, should be done to mitigate the harm caused by voter ignorance? 
Epistocrats think that we should allocate more formal political power to those citizens who possess 
more knowledge of politically relevant facts (Brennan, 2016; Mulligan, 2018; Jones, 2020; 
Malcolm, forthcoming).3 In effect, the harm caused by voter ignorance cannot be mitigated without 
transitioning away from democratic institutions to some extent. Epistocratic reforms variously try 
to ensure that only politically knowledgeable people possess political power, or that the political 
power of politically knowledgeable people is amplified relative to less knowledgeable people. 
Ideally, such reforms would increase the degree to which political decision-making is based upon 
objective, politically relevant facts.  
 A seemingly unquestioned assumption underlying arguments for epistocracy is the claim 
that greater levels of political knowledge confer superior political judgement. But this might be 
mistaken. Suitable levels of political knowledge are not the only thing central to the health of a 
well-functioning polity. In addition to well-informed citizens, we also need citizens who are 
rational.4 We need citizens who are willing to appropriately update their beliefs in response to new 
evidence. We need citizens who can set aside partisan loyalties when it becomes clear that these 
loyalties lead them astray. We need citizens who are openminded and undogmatic. Knowing what 
the available evidence indicates on politically relevant issues is, of course, deeply important. But 
a stubborn resistance to following new evidence can be quite damaging in its own right. Broadly 
 
3 By ‘formal’ I mean the sort of political power allocated to one by virtue of some law or institution. The political 
power granted to one by virtue of a legal right to vote is a paradigmatic example of such power, as are the sort of 
powers one gains upon occupying certain political offices (such as the various powers associated with being a member 
of the upper and lower houses of parliaments, the executive branch, and so forth).  
4 By ‘rational’ here I have in mind epistemic rationality. We need citizens who are both well-informed and who behave 
in paradigmatically epistemically rational ways when reasoning about political matters. Epistemically irrational 
conduct may or may not be instrumentally rational for some citizens. 
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speaking, such resistance might cause us to stick with the status-quo even if the available evidence 
indicates that it is harmful. This has important upshots for the viability of epistocracy. If more 
knowledgeable citizens are less rational, then it becomes unclear whether epistocratic institutions 
will yield the benefits ascribed to them by proponents of epistocracy. Epistocratic institutions 
might solve one problem at the cost of another.5 
 Several critics of epistocracy contend that this is precisely what the available evidence from 
political psychology shows (Friedman, 2019; Gunn, 2019; Hannon, ms). They claim that since 
more knowledgeable citizens are more partisan and less rational than their less knowledgeable 
peers, epistocratic reforms may produce even worse outcomes than the existing democratic 
institutions they are intended to supplant. This is a powerful challenge that proponents of 
epistocracy ought to take seriously, for if these critics are correct then the prospects for epistocracy 
are dim. 
  There is much evidence indicating that more knowledgeable citizens are also more 
partisan than their ill-informed peers (Judd and Brauer, 1995; Box-Steffensmeier and De Boef, 
2001; Zaller, 2004; Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008; Feldman and Price, 2008; Hetherington, 
2009; Joslyn and Haider-Markel, 2013; Kalmoe, 2020). The more one knows about politics, the 
more likely one is to be strongly allied to certain views or politicians while strongly opposed to 
others. Indeed, the causal direction is often the reverse – people more interested in politics and 
more allied to certain views will generally tend to acquire more political information. But high 
levels of partisanship create problems. Michael Hannon puts it well when he writes that: 
 
5 An independent problem facing epistocracy stems from the recognition that, in principle, the individually ignorant 
citizens empowered by democratic institutions might make collectively wise decisions, while the well-informed 
citizens empowered by epistocratic institutions might make collectively unwise decisions. In short, individual and 
collective intelligence sometimes pull apart. Since this issue has been extensively discussed elsewhere, I set it aside 
in this paper, though I note the complications it raises for discussions of the comparative epistemic merits of 
democracies and epistocracies (Surowiecki, 2005; Landemore, 2013; Goodin and Spiekermann, 2019). I consider a 




The problem…is that the most politically partisan individuals (who are also the most 
knowledgeable, remember) are also the most likely to have their thinking corrupted by 
politics (Hannon, ms: 3).  
 
In a similar vein, Paul Gunn, drawing on the seminal work of Philip Converse, notes that “the more 
political knowledge people possess, the more “constrained” by ideology they tend to be” (Gunn, 
2019: 35).6 
 It is worth understanding why more partisan individuals tend to have their thinking 
corrupted by politics more often (and more severely) than less partisan individuals. In general, 
heavily partisan individuals are more likely to possess a self-conception defined in part by their 
adherence to certain political beliefs (Haidt, 2012).7 If one were to ask such partisan individuals to 
describe themselves, they might reply by saying that they are, for instance, a supporter of the 2nd 
amendment, a fiscal conservative, or something to that effect. These beliefs are a core part of their 
identity (as they see it). Importantly, however, a body of research in political and cognitive 
psychology shows that such individuals are more prone to engaging in motivated reasoning 
(Kunda, 1990). Partisans engaged in motivated reasoning are more likely to actively seek out 
evidence that confirms their preferred views, more likely to unquestioningly accept evidence that 
supports their views, more likely to avoid evidence that conflicts with their views, more likely to 
be disproportionately critical of opposing evidence, and so on (Taber and Lodge, 2006; Taber, 
Cann, and Kucsova, 2009; Hartman and Newmark, 2012; Lodge and Taber, 2013; Bolsen, 
Druckman, and Cook, 2014; Kuru, Pasek, and Traugott, 2017; Guay and Johnston, 2020; Vegetti 
 
6 Gunn here cites Converse (1964, 213). See also Friedman (2006).  
7 Hannon calls such beliefs identity-constitutive beliefs (Hannon, ms: 4). 
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and Mancosu, 2020). In short, partisans are biased towards conclusions they like and biased against 
conclusions they dislike. Rather than dispassionately assessing the relevant evidence, partisans 
press their cognitive abilities into the service of protecting their core political beliefs.  
 Partisans, then, engage in motivated reasoning more frequently than non-partisans because 
political beliefs form a central part of their self-conception which they are strongly motivated to 
defend (Kahan, 2017; Kahan et al., 2017; Mason, 2018) The problem for epistocracy becomes 
clear. Epistocratic institutions would enhance the political power of more knowledgeable citizens 
relative to their less knowledgeable peers. But these more knowledgeable citizens also happen to 
be much more partisan than others. Since they are partisan, they will engage in the sort of corrupted 
thinking outlined above – they will dismiss ideologically inconvenient data, they will rush to 
conclusions that fit their preconceptions, they will selectively focus their critical attention onto 
views they dislike, and so on (Shani, 2006; Bartels, 2008). By attempting to empower the more 
knowledgeable among us, epistocracy will also empower those of us who most deeply exemplify 
a host of problematic epistemic vices. Political ignorance may indeed be a problem worth fixing, 
but the proposed epistocratic cure may end up worse than the illness, for it isn’t obvious that 
amplifying the political power of more partisan, less rational citizens is a reliable way to secure 
better policies and better outcomes. 
 
2. How Serious is the Problem of Epistocratic Irrationality? 
The problem of epistocratic irrationality highlights a weakness in extant epistocratic proposals. By 
focusing too much on what voters know and not enough on how voters update their beliefs in light 
of new evidence, epistocratic reforms risk placing too much power in the hands of citizens who, 
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through their epistemic vices, would often make bad decisions. It is therefore unclear whether such 
reforms would constitute an improvement over existing democratic institutions. 
 However, it is important to bear in mind the following caveat regarding the problem of 
epistocratic irrationality: even if critics of epistocracy are right to claim that the data from political 
psychology shows that more knowledgeable citizens are typically less rational than their less 
knowledgeable peers, such data cannot by itself establish that democratic institutions will out-
perform epistocratic institutions along various dimensions. To establish the superiority of existing 
democratic institutions would require a serious empirical analysis of the performance of both sorts 
of institutions. This would require investigating, inter alia, the differential impacts of ignorant 
voters on policy outcomes as against the impacts of more knowledgeable but less rational voters. 
In turn, this would require an analysis of the importance of the issues which less knowledgeable 
voters are typically ignorant of, the sorts of issues more dogmatic voters are typically reluctant to 
change their minds about, the degree to which legislators and policymakers are responsive to both 
groups of voters, and more. In short, psychological data of the sort appealed to by critics of 
epistocracy cannot furnish us with evidence regarding the overall costs and benefits of both sets 
of institutions. Instead, we would need to measure the actual performance of democratic 
institutions as against epistocratic ones.  
 In response, one might think that critics of epistocracy do not intend to show that the overall 
costs of epistocracy will outweigh its benefits, or that democratic institutions are superior to 
epistocratic ones. Instead, one might think that they intend only to undercut the claim that 
epistocratic institutions would be superior to democratic ones, and that they do so successfully.8 
Perhaps it is true that critics of epistocracy intend to offer only undercutting evidence. Nonetheless, 
 
8 I thank an anonymous referee for highlighting this point. 
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this is consistent with thinking that the ultimate test of epistocracy consists in implementing 
different epistocratic institutions and measuring their subsequent performance along various 
parameters, comparing such performance to the performance of democratic alternatives. For those 
willing to experiment with novel institutional arrangements, this is important. Additionally, in 
what follows I show that the critics have failed to successfully undercut the case for epistocracy. 
In this section I discuss some complications with the interpretation of the relevant psychological 
data critics defend, arguing that these complications should undermine our confidence in such an 
interpretation. In the following section I discuss certain classes of epistocratic institutions which 
can overcome the problem of epistocratic irrationality even if critics of epistocracy have correctly 
interpreted the relevant psychological data. 
 Regarding the former, what sort of complications do I have in mind? First, critics of 
epistocracy frame the relevant studies as showing that more knowledgeable citizens are typically 
less rational than their ill-informed counterparts. But this description of the data is underspecified. 
With this information alone we don’t know, for example, in what way the subjects of the 
experiments are knowledgeable, or whether such subjects would count as knowledgeable 
according to the standards of different epistocratic proposals. Without knowing whether the 
subjects of the experiments are the sort of people who would be disproportionately empowered by 
epistocratic mechanisms, we can’t know whether these studies in fact present a problem for 
epistocracy. In effect, we can’t know whether there really is a problem of epistocratic irrationality 
– at least, that is, for certain forms of epistocracy.  
 Consider, for example, the work of Lodge and Taber on motivated political reasoning 
(Taber and Lodge, 2006; Lodge and Taber, 2013). Critics of epistocracy point to this work as 
evidence of the claim that more knowledgeable citizens are more prone to motivated political 
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reasoning than less knowledgeable citizens (Gunn, 2019; Hannon, ms). Lodge and Taber do indeed 
find evidence of what they call a sophistication effect, wherein more knowledgeable citizens – 
sophisticates – are more prone to engaging in motivated reasoning.9 More specifically, more 
knowledgeable citizens more frequently exhibit both confirmation bias (by willingly seeking out 
confirming arguments rather than disconfirming arguments) and disconfirmation bias (by 
spending more time and energy challenging attitudinally incongruent arguments than they do on 
attitudinally congruent arguments).10 Additionally, sophisticates polarize in their beliefs to a 
greater degree than non-sophisticates (Lodge and Taber, 2013: 168). However, it’s worth noting 
that the subjects of their experiments were classed as sophisticates depending on how well they 
scored on a general political knowledge scale consisting of seventeen items, including questions 
like “What proportion of Congress is needed to override a presidential veto?”, etc. (Taber and 
Lodge, 2006: 760; Lodge and Taber, 2013: 84). Notably, Lodge and Taber use a median split to 
differentiate sophisticates from unsophisticates. 
 Similar measures of political knowledge are used in other studies purporting to show that 
more knowledgeable citizens engage in politically motivated reasoning more often than their less 
knowledgeable peers. Consider the work of Kuru, Pasek, and Traugott (2017) showing that more 
knowledgeable citizens are more prone to politically motivated reasoning about the results of 
public opinion polls, or the work of Vegetti and Mancosu (2020) showing that more 
knowledgeable citizens are prone to politically motivated reasoning about various news items. The 
former measures political knowledge using five multiple-choice questions regarding recent news 
events (Kuru, Pasek, and Traugott, 2017: 431). The latter, using a sample of Italian citizens, 
 
9 They also find evidence for what they call an attitude strength effect, where those citizens with the strongest policy 
attitudes are most prone to politically motivated reasoning (Lodge and Taber, 2013: 153).  
10 See Lodge and Taber (2013: 158-67) for an overview of the evidence they adduce in support of these claims. 
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measures political knowledge using three questions regarding the identity of the President of the 
Republic, the President of the Low Chamber, and the number of deputies in the Low Chamber 
(Vegetti and Mancosu, 2020: 7-8).11  
 Are these sophisticates the sort of people who would possess more political power under 
epistocratic institutions? Naturally, the answer varies when different forms of epistocracy are 
considered. On some forms of epistocracy, the class of sophisticates plausibly more-or-less aligns 
with the class of those citizens whose political power would be amplified. A scheme of restricted 
suffrage deploying minimally demanding voter qualification exams testing for general political 
knowledge looks like it might be adversely impacted by the findings adduced by critics of 
epistocracy.12 The same applies to any form of epistocracy allocating more political power to those 
who possess more knowledge of these basic and general political facts alone.13 But other forms of 
epistocracy with more demanding standards might escape the challenge of epistocratic irrationality 
altogether. For instance, under veto council epistocracy, a select group of extremely 
knowledgeable citizens would constitute an epistocratic council tasked with vetoing potentially 
harmful laws and policies (Brennan, 2016: 215-18). Acquaintance with only basic questions of 
general political knowledge would not grant one access to such an institution. Instead, one must 
possess considerable levels of knowledge of – and perhaps even expertise in – one of several fields, 
such as economics, sociology, political science, and more. The experiments pointed to by critics 
 
11 Indeed, such measures are pervasive in the literature on the relationship between levels of political knowledge, 
partisanship, and politically motivated reasoning. Virtually every study uses either their own general knowledge scale 
(Judd and Brauer, 1995; Box-Steffensmeier and De Boef, 2001; Federico, 2004; Feldman and Price, 2008; 
Hetherington, 2009; Taber, Cann, and Kucsova, 2009; Hartman and Newmark, 2012; Joslyn and Haider-Markel, 2013; 
Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook, 2013; Guay and Johnston, 2020) or rely upon data from sources such as American 
National Election Studies reports (Zaller, 2004; Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008; Bartels, 2008; Kalmoe, 2020). In 
either case, levels of political knowledge are gauged using relatively low numbers of general knowledge items. 
12 On restricted suffrage, see Brennan (2016: 211-14). 
13 See Gibbons (2021) for a discussion of minimal epistocracy – a form of epistocracy restricting itself only to 
uncontroversial, basic political facts. 
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of epistocracy do not establish that such citizens are more prone to engaging in motivated 
reasoning. Accordingly, forms of epistocracy using similarly demanding qualifications are not 
obviously subject to the problem of epistocratic irrationality.14 
 One might grant this point while denying its significance. In the absence of evidence that 
the sort of citizens who would satisfy extremely demanding qualification requirements behave 
more rationally than either the citizens identified as sophisticates in the psychological literature or 
non-sophisticates, why grant such an assumption? Until such evidence is supplied, the importance 
of the relevant mismatch in standards of knowledge is unclear at best. 
 This point should be conceded. Still, firstly, it is important to recognize that the available 
data does not say much about citizens that we might call extreme sophisticates – that is, citizens 
who can not only answer several basic general knowledge items, but who additionally possess 
considerable knowledge of the structure and function of existing political institutions, economics, 
political science, sociology, and more. It is at least possible that such citizens, outliers as they 
already are in the degree to which they are well-informed about politically relevant matters, may 
differ in how they reason about politics compared to other citizens. Secondly, there is some 
suggestive evidence that the most well-informed citizens (as measured by the typical scales 
deployed by political psychologists) can resist partisan influences better than their less 
knowledgeable peers (Achen and Bartels, 2006: 16, 21).15 Consequently, the fact that different 
forms of epistocracy deploy different measures of knowledge may indeed be important as far as 
the problem of epistocratic irrationality is concerned.  
 
14 This isn’t to deny that such epistocracies might be harmed by epistocratic irrationality. Whether they are or not is 
clearly an empirical question. I only claim that the studies adverted to by critics of epistocracy do not establish that 
they are in fact so harmed. 
15 Interestingly enough, Hannon also acknowledges the fact that the most well-informed citizens may be more rational 
than merely moderately well-informed citizens (Hannon, ms: 19). 
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 Second, critics of epistocracy sometimes characterize the relevant data as showing that 
higher levels of knowledge positively correlate with a greater propensity to engage in motivated 
reasoning, the adoption of more extreme views, more closemindedness, and so on. In contrast to 
more knowledgeable citizens, less knowledgeable citizens are more openminded, less prone to 
engaging in motivated reasoning, and the like. For instance, in describing the relevant 
psychological findings, Paul Gunn writes that “these effects tend to occur more frequently and 
stubbornly among citizens who are relatively well informed than among those citizens who are 
not” (Gunn, 2019: 42). This description of the data is not inaccurate, but it omits crucial details, 
oversimplifying the relationship between levels of political knowledge, political irrationality, and 
other independent traits. Indeed, the relevant data is oversimplified in at least two important ways. 
On the one hand, such a presentation of the psychological findings overlooks the possibility 
that other factors might be driving both the acquisition of political knowledge and motivated 
reasoning. Indeed, for many individuals, the key point is that they are motivated (perhaps because 
they are independently partisan) and not that they know more.16 As Taber and Lodge write: 
 
[Our] theory predicts less bias for unsophisticated and uncommitted respondents not 
because they possess a greater sense of evenhandedness, but rather because they lack the 
motivation and ability to engage in attitude defense (Taber and Lodge, 2006: 767).  
 
In short, ill-informed citizens are less epistemically virtuous than they are unmotivated, and it is 
the motivation of knowledgeable citizens that drives politically motivated reasoning, not the 
acquisition of facts per se. Similarly, some studies find that other traits that sometimes (though not 
 
16 To his credit, Hannon acknowledges this point, writing that “it is likely that partisanship is the common cause of 
both acquiring political knowledge and motivated reasoning” (Hannon, ms: 8). 
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always) correlate with high levels of knowledge are what drive attitude extremity. For instance, 
Federico argues that a high need to evaluate – a felt need to assess things for positive and negative 
qualities – is what drives attitude extremity, not high levels of knowledge (Federico, 2004: 1287).17 
 Of course, this by itself doesn’t show that critics of epistocracy are mistaken to highlight 
the importance of the correlation between high levels of political knowledge and political 
irrationality. If a tendency to engage in politically motivated reasoning correlates with levels of 
political knowledge, then epistocratic institutions may encounter a problem of irrationality even if 
the relevant relationship is not causal. For the problem of epistocratic irrationality to emerge, it is 
enough that epistocratic institutions disproportionately empower epistemically vicious citizens. 
Still, as we’ll see in Section 3, the absence of a causal relationship paves the way for more refined 
epistocratic selection mechanism that can identify (and subsequently empower) well-informed 
individuals without thereby empowering irrational individuals. 
 On the other hand, it should be noted that such a presentation of the data masks the 
considerable variety one can find among both well-informed and ill-informed citizens. To be sure, 
the data does indeed indicate that moderately knowledgeable citizens are in general less rational 
than less knowledgeable citizens. However, the gap between these two groups vanishes regarding 
certain issues (Taber and Lodge, 2006: 765). Further, Vegetti and Mancosu (2020) argue that more 
knowledgeable citizens are better than less knowledgeable citizens at uncritically accepting 
character-related misinformation. Again, Taber and Lodge put it best themselves when they 
explicitly caution against taking their findings to show that less knowledgeable citizens are free 
from epistemic vice: 
 
 
17 On the need to evaluate, see Jarvis and Petty (1996).  
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Provocative though it may be, this interpretation does not stand up to normative, 
theoretical, or empirical scrutiny…we find no empirical evidence of principled moderation 
among the bottom or middle thirds of our sample, whose extremity scores were statistically 
indistinguishable from those of the most sophisticated participants (Taber and Lodge, 
2006: 767).  
 
Ill-informed citizens may be less prone to engaging in motivated reasoning on some (though not 
all) issues, but they are somewhat prone, and they frequently adopt extreme political positions at 
similar rates to their allegedly less rational high-information peers. Critics of epistocracy, while 
not outright denying such facts, fail to recognize their importance. As suggested at the beginning 
of this section, establishing the superiority of either democratic or epistocratic institutions will 
involve measuring the differential harmful impact of generally ignorant, moderately rational 
citizens as against the impact of more highly informed but less rational citizens. Bearing in mind 
that both sets of citizens display much variety in how they process political information should 
caution us against too quickly assuming that the psychological data clearly favors one set of 
institutions over the other.  
 Lastly, we shouldn’t assume that it is always good when citizens are openminded, nor 
always bad when they are closeminded (Kruglanski and Boyatzi, 2012). Ideally, we want citizens 
to update their beliefs appropriately in light of new evidence. We don’t want citizens to constantly 
modify their views in a haphazard fashion. More obviously, we don’t want citizens to change their 
beliefs when their beliefs track the truth, or when the countervailing evidence they encounter is 
sufficiently weak or misleading. In such cases, we want citizens whose minds are closed to 
evidence that would only lead them astray. This isn’t to deny that open-mindedness is never an 
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attitude which we should wish to cultivate among the electorate, but it does suggest that our 
evaluation of the behavior of purportedly irrational and closeminded high-information citizens 
should be more sensitive to the specifics of the beliefs in question. For some beliefs in some 
settings, open-mindedness and a willingness to change one’s mind are virtues; for others, they are 
vices. 
 For example, drawing upon Zaller (2004: 166), Hannon notes that less knowledgeable 
citizens are more responsive to the content of individual elections (Hannon, ms: 6). Among other 
things, less-informed voters are more likely to reward incumbent candidates presiding over a 
strong national economy, more responsive to ideological shifts on the part of candidates, and at 
least as likely as their better-informed peers to respond positively to presidential success in 
managing foreign affairs. He further concludes, drawing upon Achen and Bartels (2016: 294), that 
“the more knowledgeable voters tended to ignore or downplay the very considerations that are 
typically viewed as an appropriate basis for electoral choice” (Hannon, ms: 6).  
 However, a closer look at the manner in which such voters respond to changes in the 
economy reveals that their behavior may not be rational. Notably, Achen and Bartels are 
themselves critical of the claim that voters can “reliably form and act upon sensible retrospective 
judgements at election time” (Achen and Bartels, 2016: 175).18 On their account, voters who 
reward Presidents presiding over strong economies often exemplify a myopic perspective, 
neglecting to take into consideration their economic welfare over appropriately long periods of 
time. Accordingly, the degree to which less informed voters reward (or punish) Presidents for the 
state of the economy is frequently inappropriate. It does not follow from this, of course, that 
knowledgeable citizens behave appropriately in not responding to economic conditions during 
 
18 See also Achen and Bartels (2002).  
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election cycles. Still, this merely reinforces the fact that how we evaluate the behavior of citizens 
who update their beliefs in response to evidence should be more sensitive to the specific details of 
any given case. Moreover, it highlights once more the occasionally substantial variation in how 
citizens with different levels of knowledge process political information.  
 Summing up, then, the significance of the psychological data adverted to by critics of 
epistocracy is unclear – the standards by which the psychologists judge that citizens are 
knowledgeable do not always match epistocratic standards; rather than a simple relationship 
between the possession of political knowledge and political irrationality, the data in fact reveals a 
complex interrelationship between levels of political knowledge, attitude extremity, political 
irrationality, and the like; and the virtues of a willingness to change one’s mind on political issues 
vary with the subject matter, the evidence prompting the update of beliefs, and more. 
Consequently, our confidence in the interpretation of the psychological data offered by critics of 
epistocracy should be undermined. If so, the severity of the problem of epistocratic irrationality is 
uncertain. 
 Before moving ahead, it’s worth considering the following possible response to the claims 
advanced in this section. One might think that given the controversial nature of many epistocratic 
proposals, the burden of justification lies squarely with epistocrats defending the epistemic 
superiority of their preferred institutions. Rebutting critical discussions of epistocracy by issuing 
purely negative critiques in return is not enough to discharge this burden. Instead, a positive 
defense of epistocratic institutions (as against democratic alternatives) is required. Applied to the 
case at hand, while it may be true that the data from political psychology lacks the implications 




However, even if this claim about the burden of justification is correct, this sort of response 
suffers from two problems. First, it effectively leaves worries grounded in the putative irrationality 
of politically knowledgeable citizens behind, conceding that current claims of epistocratic 
irrationality are unsuccessful. In short, one can’t make this concession while at the same time 
claiming that the critics have successfully undercut the case for epistocracy. To be sure, this too 
does not constitute a positive argument in favor of epistocracy. However, such a concession is 
indicative of the fact that as far as the comparative epistemic performance of both democratic and 
epistocratic institutions is concerned, it is an open question as to which is superior. As alluded to 
earlier, for those willing to experiment with novel institutional arrangements, this is important. 
Such individuals, noting the failure of current arguments to demonstrate the irrationality of 
epistocracy, ought to consider epistocratic institutions a live option – at least, that is, certain sorts 
of epistocratic institutions with the ability to overcome any potential problem with epistocratic 
irrationality. 
Second, as we shall see in the next section, the burden of justification has been met for a 
certain class of epistocratic institutions. Indeed, since there exists much evidence in favor of the 
superior epistemic performance of certain epistocratic institutions (relative to more democratic 
alternatives), the burden of justification plausibly lies with critics of these institutions rather than 
their supporters. 
 
3. Overcoming Epistocratic Irrationality 
The previous section provided some reasons to doubt the interpretation of the psychological data 
appealed to by critics of epistocracy. Suppose, though, that this interpretation is accurate. What 
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follows from this? In this section I argue that even if their interpretation is accurate, it still does 
not follow that we should reject epistocratic institutions in favor of democratic institutions.  
The problem of epistocratic irrationality is more severe when the costs of epistocratic 
irrationality outweigh the benefits of amplifying the political power of more knowledgeable 
citizens.19 However, some epistocratic institutions will plausibly be able to mitigate the harmful 
effects of epistocratic irrationality better than others. If they can mitigate these effects such that 
the costs of irrationality are outweighed by the benefits of empowering more knowledgeable 
citizens, such institutions will still be viable.  
I focus on two strategies for epistocrats. First, I explore whether refined selection 
mechanisms that avoid placing too much power in the hands of irrational citizens could help to 
ameliorate epistocratic irrationality. I then discuss implementing only those epistocratic 
institutions that have a reliable track record of outperforming their more democratic counterparts. 
 
3.1. Refined Selection Mechanisms  
A presupposition that seemingly underlies the problem of epistocratic irrationality is that 
epistocracies are committed to uncritically using mechanisms that empower more knowledgeable 
citizens. Since, let’s suppose, more knowledgeable citizens are less rational, the virtues of such 
mechanisms are questionable at best. This presupposition is not unreasonable since proponents of 
epistocracy often place heavy emphasis on knowledge of politically important factual matters. 
 
19 To be clear, such a distribution of costs and benefits would still not establish the superiority of democratic 
institutions. Even if the problem of epistocratic irrationality is severe, it might be that the problem of political 
ignorance in democracies is even more severe.  
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Still, there is no reason why epistocrats cannot expand their focus to include the sort of epistemic 
virtues rightly stressed by critics of epistocracy.20 
 How might epistocrats appropriately expand their focus? Recall that the psychological data 
adduced by critics of epistocracy does not show that all well-informed citizens are irrational, even 
setting aside the problems discussed in the previous section. It is perhaps true that, on average, 
better-informed citizens are less rational than ill-informed citizens, but there are exceptions to this 
general trend. Most notably, some well-informed citizens are also politically rational. Such citizens 
can form the target for suitably refined epistocratic selection mechanisms. If we could devise ways 
to identify citizens who are both well-informed and less prone to various forms of political 
irrationality, we could amplify their political power rather than the political power of well-
informed citizens tout court.  
 The use of such refined selection mechanisms faces two important obstacles. First, one 
must devise sufficiently precise tests to distinguish between appropriately rational, knowledgeable 
citizens and their equally knowledgeable but less rational peers. Second, use of the relevant tests 
must be feasible given the overall epistocratic arrangement in question. Questions of feasibility 
here primarily revolve around the degree to which the tests can be used cheaply and effectively, 
especially given large numbers of citizens. These two obstacles are not independent. For instance, 
the most precise tests may be prohibitively costly to use when large numbers of people are 
involved, and this might count against certain forms of epistocracy. Correlatively, cost-effective 
tests may not reliably distinguish between the relevant groups of citizens. Epistocrats thus face 
 
20 Indeed, the importance of such virtues is already recognized by epistocrats, even if they are discussed less often 
than knowledge of important factual matters. For example, Brennan defends veto council epistocracy at least partly 
due to the prospect of such a council providing a forum for its members to engage in careful deliberation (Brennan, 
2016: 215-18). Presumably, such careful deliberation is not desirable for its own sake, but for its ability to allow 
council members to learn from one another, change their minds on certain issues (if necessary), and the like. The veto 




potential trade-offs between accuracy and cost-effectiveness, with such trade-offs needing to be 
factored into any overall cost-benefit assessment of epistocratic proposals. 
Let’s consider an example that helps to highlight the difficulties that epistocrats may face 
in using refined selection mechanisms. A natural strategy for epistocrats looking to overcome the 
problem of epistocratic irrationality is to implement a plural voting scheme wherein the most 
epistemically virtuous citizens receive comparatively more votes than either their ignorant and ill-
informed peers or their well-informed but irrational peers.21 A nice feature of this form of 
epistocracy is that, in principle, it could accommodate the claim that the latter group of citizens 
more harmfully impact political outcomes than the former group. Roughly speaking, we have four 
groups of citizens to consider: (i) ignorant and irrational citizens, (ii) ignorant but more rational 
citizens, (iii) well-informed but irrational citizens, and (iv) well-informed and rational citizens. 
Depending on the magnitude of harm ascribed to empowering each group (or the magnitude of 
expected benefits in the case of the last group), we could allocate numbers of votes accordingly. If 
well-informed but irrational citizens make worse decisions than ignorant but more rational citizens, 
we could modify the numbers to diminish the influence of the former. However, the central aim of 
such a scheme of plural voting would be to amplify the power of the most epistemically virtuous 
citizens. 
However, empowering the right citizens is easier said than done. We must first identify the 
relevant people. One option to consider is the use of indirect tests of political rationality such as 
standard measures of cognitive reflection, rationality quotients, and the like (Frederick, 2005; 
Stanovich, 2016). If scoring well on such measures reliably correlates with a propensity to engage 
with politically contentious issues in a suitably rational manner, such tests may work well as 
 
21 For more on plural voting, see Brennan (2016: 211-14) and Mulligan (2018). 
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proxies for political rationality. However, if no correlation exists (or if there is an inverse 
correlation between the relevant traits), use of these indirect tests risks bringing about the very 
distribution of power which critics of epistocracy worry about – namely, one where politically 
irrational citizens find their political power unduly increased.22  
Forgoing indirect measures, one might rely upon measures that directly test for political 
rationality. For instance, we can measure levels of political rationality in the same way that the 
political psychologists cited by critics of epistocracy measure it. In other words, in addition to 
examining the degree to which citizens possess knowledge of politically relevant facts, we can 
assess, among other things, the degree to which they are capable of mitigating confirmation and 
disconfirmation biases (as well as other cognitive biases), the degree to which they are willing and 
able to update their beliefs in response to evidence in ways that are incongruent with their prior 
positions, the degree to which they can fairly and accurately state the strongest case for views they 
are ideologically opposed to, and so on. Discussing the precise details of such measures will 
involve empirical concerns that are beyond the scope of this paper. The important point for our 
purposes is that while such direct measures are far more accurate than indirect measures, their use 
is likely not feasible for an arrangement such as plural voting, for subjecting large numbers of 
citizens to these measures is likely too expensive and too time-consuming. 
Generalizing the preceding discussion, it becomes clear that some forms of epistocracy are 
more affected by the problem of epistocratic irrationality than others. To a first approximation, 
forms of epistocracy that involve very large numbers of citizens – up to and including the entire 
electorate – are most negatively impacted. For example, schemes of restricted suffrage and, as 
noted, plural voting, are likely not feasible given the problem of epistocratic irrationality and a 
 
22 Kahan suggests that there is indeed an inverse correlation between the relevant traits (Kahan, 2017). If this is correct, 
the use of indirect measures of political rationality may not be feasible whatsoever. 
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lack of accurate, cost-effective indirect measures for refined selection mechanisms. At the same 
time, though, since the cost of utilizing more precise, direct measures of political rationality varies 
with institutional background, some forms of epistocracy will be able to feasibly make use of them. 
Roughly put, as we reduce the number of people to which we seek to apply individually costly 
measures of political rationality, the aggregate cost of using such measures decreases to such an 
extent that certain epistocratic institutions become correspondingly more feasible. 
What forms of epistocracy can avail of these direct measures? To take an example, consider 
again veto council epistocracy. Recall that under this form of epistocracy a select group of highly 
competent individuals would constitute an epistocratic council tasked with overseeing the 
legislative activities of other institutions. Extremely demanding qualification requirements would 
be in place to ensure that only the most competent and knowledgeable individuals are admitted. 
Adding further tests with the aim of preventing politically irrational agents from joining the council 
would yield higher feasibility costs compared to a veto council without these tests. Importantly, 
though, the relatively low numbers involved ensures that veto council epistocracy has much lower 
aggregate feasibility costs than arrangements like plural voting or restricted suffrage epistocracy. 
While the latter arrangements employ significantly simpler qualification requirements, the massive 
number of tests required drives the feasibility costs up. In contrast, the veto council has lower total 
feasibility costs even though it uses relatively sophisticated qualification requirements. For veto 
council epistocracy, then, further tests to distinguish between prospective council members of 
varying levels of rationality are not the drawback they were for epistocracies with higher feasibility 
costs. Accordingly, the use of refined selection mechanisms provides the veto council with a 
plausible tool to mitigate the problem of epistocratic irrationality. 
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Something similar is true of other epistocratic institutions aiming to increase the political 
influence of relatively low numbers of individuals. For instance, the enfranchisement lottery, 
wherein a descriptively representative random sample of the population is selected in order to 
engage in competence-building exercises so that they become better-informed about ballot options 
could easily be tweaked to accommodate concerns regarding epistocratic irrationality.23 Rather 
than competence-building exercises alone, descriptively random samples of the population could 
be subjected to additional screening to ensure that only appropriately rational citizens are furnished 
with voting rights. For another, consider rule by simulated oracle (Brennan, 2016: 220-22; 
Ahlstrom-Vij, 2020). Under this arrangement, we simulate what the electorate would prefer if they 
were fully informed about important politically relevant facts. Oversimplifying somewhat, we 
achieve this by surveying citizens’ political preferences together with their demographic 
information, as well as testing their political knowledge. We can then simulate what their 
preferences would be if we simulated full knowledge while holding the rest of their demographics 
fixed. A natural modification to such an institution, then, is to use the same method to simulate 
political preferences given full information and high levels of political rationality.  
Summing up, then, while the problem of epistocratic irrationality threatens some 
epistocratic institutions, others are much less threatened. Restricted suffrage and plural voting may 
not be feasible, but institutions such as the veto council, the enfranchisement lottery, and even rule 
by simulated oracle can be readily modified to better avoid increasing the power of knowledgeable 
but irrational citizens.24 
 
 
23 For more on the enfranchisement lottery, see López-Guerra (2014: 4) and Brennan (2016: 214-5).  
24 Additionally, forms of limited epistocracy empowering relatively lows numbers of experts in narrowly 
circumscribed roles could feasibly avail of precise and costly measures of political rationality. On limited epistocracy, 
see Jeffrey (2018).  
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3.2. Conservative Epistocratic Institutions 
Refined selection mechanisms provide a potentially useful tool for epistocrats seeking to safeguard 
more radical epistocratic proposals against the harms of widespread epistocratic irrationality. But 
there are easier ways to increase the likelihood that the costs of epistocratic irrationality are 
outweighed by the benefits of empowering more knowledgeable people. Instead of opting for 
controversial institutional reforms, we could adjust existing institutions in ways that have a good 
track record of improving performance. In the same vein, we could protect currently successful 
institutions where disproportionate levels of political power are already placed in the hands of 
more knowledgeable people. These sorts of conservative epistocratic proposals either modify 
existing institutions in an epistocratic direction or prevent the modification of existing institutions 
in less epistocratic directions. 
 By ‘conservative’, I mean to stress the sense in which these proposals are either 
manifestations of institutions we already have experience with or are significantly influenced by 
such institutions. Specifically, these are institutions which have a track record of good performance 
(relative to some non-epistocratic alternative). Consider the difference between a plural voting 
scheme utilizing refined selection mechanisms and, say, requiring that civil servants possess 
certain qualifications. Transitioning from democratic institutions with universal and equal suffrage 
to plural voting is risky, at least in part owing to the uncertainty surrounding the efficacy of such 
an institution. We may have suggestive indirect evidence bearing on the prospective performance 
of plural voting, but we can point to very few concrete exemplars with an actual track record we 
can examine.25 In contrast, requiring that civil servants possess certain qualifications relevant to 
 
25 Plural voting schemes of different sorts have historically been adopted by several countries, including the United 
Kingdom, New Zealand, and the Republic of Ireland. But it is important to note that these forms of plural voting were 
not identical to the sorts of plural voting defended by contemporary epistocrats, let alone epistocracy with refined 
selection mechanisms. Their evidential import is thus unclear. 
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the role they occupy is conservative in the sense that we have concrete evidence bearing on the 
importance of qualifications. If one were to measure the performance of civil engineers with 
legitimate engineering credentials against the performance of civil engineers without such 
credentials, one would quickly see the virtues of qualification requirements which are, strictly 
speaking, epistocratic constraints on access to civil service positions. 
 Conservative epistocratic institutions of this sort have recently been defended by Garret 
Jones (Jones, 2020). For example, drawing on a wide range of data from political science, he argues 
that independent central banks typically outperform central banks more tightly constrained by 
democratic politics. Independent central banks are more reliably correlated with low rates of 
inflation, low and stable rates of unemployment, steady economic growth, fewer financial crises, 
and more (Jones, 2020: 41-62). Maintaining the independence of central banks is epistocratic to 
the extent that insulation from democratic politics allows members of the central bank to draw 
upon their expertise in a more consistent fashion than would be possible if they were subject to 
pressure from the electorate, representatives of the electorate, and so on. Epistocrats, then, may 
wish to protect currently independent central banks from modification in less epistocratic 
directions. Alternatively, they may urge states without central banks to move in an epistocratic 
direction.26 
 Jones defends other institutions on similar grounds. For example, he argues that appointed, 
epistocratic city treasurers typically outperform elected treasurers, doing a better job of managing 
their city’s finances (Jones, 2020: 76-80). Moreover, he suggests that the virtues of such 
 
26 One may think that having no central bank whatsoever is better than having either an independent central bank or a 
central bank constrained by democratic politics (Rothbard, 1994). But this is consistent with thinking that if we are to 
have a central bank, then we should have an independent central bank. In such a case, the epistocratic institution is 
still preferable to the democratic institution on instrumental grounds, even if there is an instrumental justification for 
abolishing the institution entirely. 
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institutions provide us with a blueprint for creating novel epistocratic institutions. Drawing on 
work from Maskin and Tirole (2004), he writes that “when it’s crucial to get the technical details 
right and when the policy debate is less about values and more about facts and competent 
execution, that’s a likely a good opportunity to delegate power to unelected bureaucrats (Jones, 
2020: 91-2). For instance, extending the rationale behind maintaining an independent central bank, 
we could implement a Federal Tax Board (Ibid, 93-94).27 A broad division of labor could exist 
between Congress (which would decide the broad contours of policy) and the Federal Tax Board 
(which would focus on the precise details). To be sure, the implementation of such a novel 
epistocratic institutions is certainly less conservative than maintaining the independence of an 
already independent central bank. But it is much less radical than, say, transitioning to a political 
arrangement characterized by use of the enfranchisement lottery since there is already much 
evidence that institutions of the former sort can outperform democratic alternatives. 
 For the purposes of this paper, we can remain silent on whether Jones correctly assesses 
the relevant data or not. The important point is that opting only for conservative epistocratic 
institutions offers a simple way for epistocrats to overcome the problem of political irrationality. 
This claim immediately raises two separate questions. First, what sorts of conservative institutions 
count as epistocratic? Secondly, and more importantly, in what way do these institutions help 
overcome the problem of epistocratic irrationality?  
Regarding the first question, let’s count as epistocratic any institution which makes the 
possession of knowledge or expertise an official requirement of occupying certain roles. According 
to this account, many existing institutions are epistocratic even if not widely recognized as such. 
For instance, limits to universal suffrage withholding the right to vote from children are 
 
27 See also Blinder (2018).  
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epistocratic to the extent that they are defended on the grounds that children (especially young 
children) lack sufficient knowledge or judgement to vote competently (Brennan, 2011: 701). 
Similarly, members of the judiciary are subject to epistocratic constraints given that jurisprudential 
expertise is a legal requirement for attaining the relevant positions. Conservative epistocratic 
reforms, then, might often take the form of implementing these sorts of relatively uncontroversial 
institutions (or, alternatively, safeguarding them against those who would wish to remove 
epistocratic constraints). 
 Regarding the second question, conservative epistocratic institutions undermine the 
problem of epistocratic irrationality because there is much evidence suggesting that the relevant 
institutions outweigh the costs associated with epistocratic irrationality. In a sense, reliance upon 
conservative institutions builds in a response to the problem of epistocratic irrationality from the 
outset, since this problem trades on the prospect of the costs outweighing the benefits. This isn’t 
to say that conservative institutions will always be superior to more radical ones such as plural 
voting, the veto council, and so on. But conservative institutions can be defended in a less 
speculative fashion. In addition to epistocracies using refined selection mechanisms with low 
feasibility costs, then, conservative epistocratic institutions provide a relatively clear way for 
epistocrats to rebut worries revolving around epistocratic irrationality - they simply outperform 
their democratic counterparts, even if more knowledgeable citizens tend to be less rational than 
less knowledgeable citizens. 
 Before moving on, two further clarifications are in order. Firstly, the class of conservative 
epistocratic institutions can shift over time as more evidence is gathered regarding the efficacy of 
different institutions. If epistocratic councils were to be formed in many different countries, and if 
such councils were to perform well, they could eventually be classified as conservative in the 
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relevant sense. As evidence of their solid performance mounts, it would become correspondingly 
less risky to consider implementing them. 
Secondly, conservative proposals are not necessarily proposals to modify institutions 
incrementally (or proposals to prevent the incremental modification of existing institutions in less 
epistocratic directions). In general, institutional reform might take place in increments – that is, by 
slight adjustments along the margins of existing institutions. Whether a given adjustment counts 
as incremental is vague, but one can point to clear instances of incremental adjustments as against 
non-incremental adjustments. Intensifying the qualification requirements for access to certain civil 
service positions is an incremental adjustment, while the abolition of universal suffrage is not. In 
practice, conservative epistocratic reform will often be incremental. Incremental adjustments may 
be easier to attempt, and it may subsequently be easier to develop a body of evidence about their 
performance. But in principle we could have solid evidence about wide-ranging epistocratic 
reforms. If so, these non-incremental reforms would properly be described as conservative in the 
sense outlined earlier. If conservative epistocratic reforms tend to be incremental, this is at most 
reflects a contingent fact about what sorts of reforms people are typically willing to attempt. 
 
4. Objections and Replies 
In this section I address some objections to the claims defended in previous sections. First, one 
might worry that empowering collections of individually rational agents may not translate to 
collectively rational group decision-making. If groups constituted by individually rational agents 
can behave irrationally, then even epistocracy with refined selection mechanisms might not solve 
the problem of epistocratic irrationality. Second, one might worry that the problem of epistocratic 
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irrationality can only be solved by epistocratic institutions that would create or exacerbate other 
more serious problems. If so, epistocratic institutions should not be implemented. 
 
4.1. Epistocracy and the Independence Thesis 
Individual and group rationality can pull apart. Individually irrational agents can form rational 
groups, and individually rational agents can form irrational groups. Call this the Independence 
Thesis (Mayo-Wilson, Zollman, and Danks, 2011).28 For example, individual scientists who 
dogmatically defend certain theories can help ensure that good theories remain within the wider 
scientific community (Zollman, 2010). This, in turn, might help the scientific community 
ultimately converge on the truth. By analogy, perhaps a political decision-making body constituted 
by individually irrational agents can somehow outperform one constituted by individually rational 
agents. 
 The Independence Thesis complicates the process of creating epistemically well-
functioning groups, in politics and elsewhere. One can’t simply gather a collection of individually 
rational agents and subsequently guarantee collectively rational decision-making. One must also 
pay attention to the group’s internal structure, its dynamics, and more. Consequently, the case for 
using refined epistocratic selection mechanisms becomes considerably more complex since we 
can’t be sure that the eventual group of individually rational (and well-informed) agents will 
behave in collectively rational ways. If that’s right, then we should be less confident in the ability 
of refined selection mechanisms to overcome the problem of epistocratic irrationality. 
 
28 There are in fact several different formulations of the underlying insight that individual and group rationality can 
diverge. Strictly speaking, then, there is no single independence thesis (Mayo-Wilson, Zollman, and Danks, 2011: 
655). I set aside this complication moving forward, writing of the independence thesis for convenience.  
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 Though programmatic, this sort of objection is undeniably important. If epistocrats are 
serious about designing epistemically well-functioning institutions, they must consider the internal 
structure and group dynamics of the relevant decision-making bodies they seek to implement. With 
that said, there are at least three important qualifications one must bear in mind regarding such an 
appeal to the Independence Thesis.  
 Firstly, the Independence Thesis does not say that no decision-making body constituted by 
individually rational agents can behave in collectively rational ways. Nor does it say that no 
epistocratic institution can outperform any democratic institution. Instead, it tells us that individual 
and group rationality pull apart. It cautions us against thinking that when we have a collection of 
individually rational agents, we thereby have a group of agents that will together behave rationally. 
But whether any given group is in fact organized in epistemically optimal ways is an empirical 
question. We shouldn’t assume that refined selection mechanisms will automatically yield rational 
groups, to be sure, but we also shouldn’t assume that we can’t successfully use refined selection 
mechanisms to mitigate the problem of epistocratic irrationality. 
Secondly, an epistocratic tu quoque – much as the independence thesis complicates the 
case for epistocracy with refined selection mechanisms, it complicates the case against epistocracy 
grounded in the problem of epistocratic irrationality. The force of the problem of epistocratic 
irrationality lay in the fact that much psychological research seemingly indicates that the sort of 
well-informed citizens who would be empowered by epistocratic institutions are also typically less 
rational than their ill-informed peers. However, per the Independence Thesis, groups of 
individually irrational agents can constitute collectively rational groups. Individually irrational and 
knowledgeable citizens might constitute epistemically well-functioning groups despite their 
individual epistemic vices. Critics of epistocracy appealing to the Independence Thesis, then, 
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undermine the case for refined selection mechanisms at the cost of undermining their initial 
critique.  
Thirdly, and more positively, conservative epistocratic institutions are not subject to this 
worry. At the very least, this sort of worry is much less serious for conservative epistocratic 
institutions. By stipulation, we can already be reasonably confident that the relevant institutions 
strike an appropriate balance between individual and group rationality. At the very least, we can 
be reasonably confident that conservative epistocratic institutions do a better job of striking such 
a balance than their democratic counterparts. If no such institutions existed, then the Independence 
Thesis would be much more troublesome for epistocrats. But since we can find examples of 
conservative epistocratic institutions, then at least some epistocratic institutions remain viable.  
Ultimately, then, the appeal to the Independence Thesis fails. For use of refined selection 
mechanisms, it is inconclusive, at most suggesting that we ought to be cautious in assuming that 
group rationality will emerge from the interaction of individually rational agents. For conservative 
epistocratic institutions, we can already be confident that group rationality does indeed emerge 
from the interactions of the agents constituting the relevant group, at least to a certain extent. 
 
4.2. The Problem of Unintended Consequences 
To be fully successful, political institutions designed to solve certain problems need to avoid 
creating or exacerbating comparably severe (or even worse) problems. An anti-corruption agency 
with exorbitantly high operational costs, even if it functions as intended, might be a net cost if the 
funds allocated to its operation could have been better used elsewhere.29 Along the same lines, 
epistocratic institutions with the means to overcome the problem of epistocratic irrationality might 
 
29 In general, the optimal level of corruption in any given society might be non-zero. C.f. Klitgaard (1988). 
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solve that problem only while creating or exacerbating others. If the costs of these other problems 
exceed the benefits of the relevant epistocratic institutions, we should deem these institutions 
failures, even if they successfully tackle the problem they were designed to tackle.  
 For instance, suppose that a veto council can successfully overcome the problem of 
epistocratic irrationality, with its low feasibility costs allowing it to deploy highly multifaceted 
selection mechanisms. But suppose further that this council would increase risks of abuse and 
corruption that, in expectation, outweigh the expected gains (Vandamme, 2019).30 If so, we ought 
not implement the veto council. Taken in isolation, the institution is a success, performing its 
function as intended. But when its overall impact on the larger political arrangement of which it is 
a part is considered, it is a failure. It worsens other problems, even if unintentionally. 
 Like the previous appeal to the independence thesis, this objection is at best inconclusive. 
Whether there are potential complications that would arise with even those epistocratic institutions 
well-equipped to overcome the problem of epistocratic irrationality is an empirical question. At 
most, it again counsels us to adopt a cautious approach to the implementation of novel political 
institutions. However, this is – or ought to be - a perfectly general point. The expected 
complications of novel institutions need to be factored into their overall assessment whether they 
are epistocratic or democratic, and we should proceed with caution if uncertain about the 
downstream negative consequences of implementing them.  
 Moreover, and again like the previous objection, this worry is most serious for non-
conservative epistocratic proposals for which there is uncertainty regarding their efficacy. But 
 
30 Two complications are omitted here as they are beyond the scope of this paper. First, that the veto council might 
increase the risk of various political abuses is simply taken for granted to illustrate a wider point; namely, that 
institutions may have unintended consequences which militate against their implementation. Second, I ignore the 
possibility that epistocratic institutions could be modified to avoid political abuse. Though I can’t defend the claim 
here, I think that worries about the potential abuse of epistocratic institutions are often overstated, especially given the 
possibility of modifications that could be made to such institutions to prevent abuse. 
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conservative epistocratic institutions are precisely those institutions for which we have some 
evidence of their merits. Since we have evidence of the expected performance of these institutions, 
in some cases we can be confident that they won’t create or exacerbate problems to such an extent 
the gains from mitigating epistocratic irrationality are outweighed by the costs. There may indeed 
be costs associated with institutions such as civil service qualification requirements, independent 
central banks, and the like, but the evidence suggests that these costs are outweighed by various 
gains. 
 The problem of unintended consequences does not show that epistocratic institutions are 
infeasible. For non-conservative proposals, it shows at most that we should be cautious about 
implementing them. Conservative epistocratic institutions, as before, bypass this problem. We can 
already be confident that they do not create negative unintended consequences which outweigh 
their expected benefits. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Epistocrats perhaps reasonably worry about high levels of political ignorance among voters. But 
their critics reasonably observe in turn that increasing the political power of those citizens who 
possess more knowledge is not guaranteed to constitute an improvement over the status quo. If 
these citizens also happen to be much less rational than their ignorant peers, epistocratic reforms 
might just make things worse.  
 It’s important in that regard to get clear on what the data from political psychology shows. 
As argued in Section 2, critics of epistocracy overstate the degree to which the relevant findings 
establish that different epistocratic institutions would empower irrational citizens in harmful ways. 
More crucially, though, critics of epistocracy have overlooked the possibility that certain 
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incarnations of epistocracy could overcome the problem of epistocratic irrationality entirely, even 
if the relevant psychological data has the implications the critics claim it has. Perhaps more refined 
epistocratic selection mechanisms could allow us to screen for irrational citizens, provided the 
feasibility costs of using such mechanisms are sufficiently low. Perhaps we could play it safe, 
opting to implement or preserve conservative institutions with a track record of solid performance. 
Perhaps both could be pursued in tandem. Whatever the case, epistocrats have viable strategies for 
mitigating the problem of epistocratic irrationality. 
On balance, then, while critics of epistocracy have alerted us to potential complications 
that could arise upon transitioning to some form of epistocracy, they have not shown that all forms 
of epistocracy are equally suspect. The problem of epistocratic irrationality, if it is indeed a 
problem, can be overcome.31 
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